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COMMENTS
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND LOUISIANA
The common law doctrine of promissory estoppel has gen-
erally been set forth in Section 90 of the Restatement of Con-
tracts, which reads as follows:
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise."'
In Ducote v. Oden2 counsel attempted to invoke the doctrine
before the Louisiana Supreme Court. The case involved an al-
leged breach of an oral contract under which the plaintiff had
removed overburden from defendant's gravel pit. Defendant al-
legedly agreed that the employment was to last three years and
plaintiff in reliance on such assurances, incurred heavy expendi-
tures by purchasing equipment necessary to comply with his
obligation. Defendant, however, terminated the employment in
about seven months. Left without means to pay for the equip-
ment, plaintiff argued that defendant should have reasonably
expected that his representations would induce the substantial
change in position taken by him and that refusal to enforce the
promise would result in injustice. Plaintiff, however, made no
attempt to show the doctrine's applicability under the provisions
of the Civil Code. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in rejecting
plaintiff's contention, asserted that the theory of promissory
estoppel was unknown to our law.8 The result of this case
prompted one commentator to declare:
"Some of the cases from common law jurisdictions dem-
onstrate misapplications of Section 90 sufficiently flagrant to
have given the draftsmen of that section cause to doubt the
wisdom of its inclusion or the choice of language it con-
1. RrSTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932). Promissory estoppel as a con-
tract doctrine has been expressly acknowledged for nearly fifty years. It was
first formulated in 1920 by Samuel Williston, see 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 139 (1st ed. 1920). The doctrine was included as Section 90 in the Restate-
ment of Contracts published in 1932. See generally Boyer, Promissory Es-
toppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 459
(1950).
2. 221 La. 228, 59 So.2d 130 (1952).
3. Id. at 234, 59 So.2d at 132.
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tains. It is heartening that our court is not willing to suc-
cumb to its wiles."4
In competing systems of law it appears inevitable that
similar solutions to nearly identical problems will be reached
by employing totally different concepts. Louisiana contract law
is based upon the civil law and is thus governed by the provi-
sions of the Civil Code. Thus, if such promises are enforceable,
they must be so only under the provisions of the Louisiana Civil
Code. The purpose of this paper is to examine the application
of the doctrine of promissory estoppel at common law and to
compare it with the manner in which similar specific problems
may be solved under the civil law. This comparison will demon-
strate that there is no need for Louisiana courts to resort to an
importation of the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel.
In the past Louisiana courts have provided solutions to analagous
problems simply by application of the general provisions of the
civil code relating to contract, quasi-delict, and delict. Compari-
sons between applications of promissory estoppel under the com-
mon law and applications of the provisions of the Louisiana Civil
Code are herein limited to two factual situations-enforcement
of charitable subscriptions and subcontractor-contractor bid re-
lations. These two factual situations have been selected because
the doctrine of promissory estoppel is well established in the
former while only emerging in the latter. In addition, these com-
parisons will serve to illustrate the basic distinctions between
the common law and the civil law in relation to the formation
of contracts. A final section is included for the purpose of dem-
onstrating how the general principles expressed in the Code have
been applied to miscellaneous factual situations to achieve a
result similar to that reached by the use of promissory estoppel.
Contract Principles: Basic Distinctions
The most distinctive feature of the Anglo-American law of
contract is the doctrine of consideration.5 It is based upon the
4. Smith, The Work of the Louwsiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1959
Term-Conventional Obligations, 13 LA. L. REv. 236, 241 (1953).
5. "How consideration became an element of contract is not clear beyond
a doubt. It is not thought that this was a mere accident of history. The
enforcement of business transactions was, on the threshold of modern times,
a social necessity, whereas the enforcement of gift promises was not, and
might even be a social mischief. However this may be, the effect of the de-
velopment has been that English law has never recognized the binding force
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principle that for an informal contract to be valid it is neces-
sary that a sufficient consideration be given for the promise
contained therein.6 If there is no consideration the promise is
gratuitous and is valid only when embodied in a sealed instru-
ment.7 The American Law Institute has adopted a narrow defi-
nition of consideration based upon the theory of bargain and
exchange.8 Nevertheless, it has also recognized that there are
promises which create legal rights and duties despite the fact
that they have not been bargained for or given in exchange for
an act or forbearance, a change in legal relations, or for a return
promise. A promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limi-
tations is enforceable,9 as is a promise to pay a debt discharged
in bankruptcy.10 Promises to perform a voidable duty" and those
which reasonably induce definite and substantial action may like-
wise be enforced.12 Therefore, while the general rule obtains
that no obligation is imposed upon one making an informal prom-
ise unless that promise is supported by consideration, the com-
mon law, as modified, attempts to provide enforceability between
the extremes of a "naked promise" and one given for an equiva-
lent. Included within the enforceable promises are those which
fall under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. From the defini-
tion contained in Section 90 and from the cases, four essential
elements have emerged for the enforcement of a promise inducing
an unbargained for reliance. These are (1) the making of a
promise which is of such character that the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action in reliance thereon; (2) the
promisee must, in fact, reasonably rely thereon; (3) in so relying
of agreement as such: it requires either the observation of a form or con-
sideration." Note, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 675, 677 (1965).
6. A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 110 at 165 (student ed. 1952); 1 S. WMLSTON,
CONTRACTS § 99 (rev. ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1932).
7. The majority of states have abolished or modified the special effect
of the seal so that a promise to be valid requires consideration whether or
not it is made by a sealed instrument. This means that a promise not
supported by consideration cannot be validly made. This principle has been
modified in various ways, and in the particular rule of promissory estoppel.
Note, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 675, 680 (1965).
8. RuSTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1932): "(1) Consideration for a prom-
ise is (a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a forbearance, or (c) the
creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation, or (d) a return
promise, bargained for and given in exchange for the promise. .. ." Comment
(a): "No duty is generally imposed on one who makes an informal promise
unless the promise is supported by sufficient consideration."
9. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1932).
10. Id. at § 87.
11. Id. at § 89.
12. Id. at § 90.
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the promisee must have suffered some economic detriment, and
(4) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.13
By the expanded application of this doctrine in recent times, the
common law concept of contract has been widely broadened.
The principle of promissory estoppel has been applied to a
variety of situations.14 The doctrine has been said to have arisen
out of cases involving charitable subscriptions,i and one juris-
diction has attempted to limit its application to that situation.'8
The doctrine has often been applied in situations where the
promisor has indicated an intention to abandon an existing legal
right,17 and some courts have attempted to expand it no further.18
While its application has been liberal in the area of gratuitous
promises,1 courts in the past have been quite reluctant to apply
the principle to bargain transactions.20 More recently, however,
13. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 200 (1963); Note 13 VAND. L. R v. 705, 706
(1960).
14. See Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents, 50 MICn.
L. REv. 639, 644 (1952) for an excellent discussion of the development and
application of the doctrine. It is stated that the doctrine has been applied
In at least five different fact situations:
(1) Charitable subscriptions,
(2) parol promises to give land,
(3) gratuitous bailment,
(4) gratuitous agency, and
(5) miscellaneous situations including pension plans, waiver, and rent
reductions.
15. Note, 13 VAND. L. REV. 705, 706 (1960).
16. Comfort v. McCorkle, 149 Misc. 826, 268 N.Y.S. 192 (1933). The court
In dictum restricted the application of § 90 to subscription and donation
cases. See Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and ,imitations of the
Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 459, 479 (1950). "There is, however, a danger that
courts will not understand the doctrine and be fearful of applying it. Unless
this requirement [of action in reliance] is formulated so that it is readily
understandable and applicable, the doctrine may be strictly limited in its
use, thus failing to provide a needed amount of flexibility in contract law.
Indications of this tendency are already apparent in holdings that promissory
estoppel is to be employed only in charitable subscriptoins, and is not to be
resorted to in commercial transactions."
17. Illustrative cases are: Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 211 P.2d 806
(1949) (not to plead statute of limitations); Miller v. Lowlor, 245 Iowa 1144,
66 N.W.2d 267 (1954) (not to plead Statute of Frauds); Edwards v. Smith,
322 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1959) (not to enforce acceleration clause). See also
Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1058 (1956).
18. Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 126 A.2d 646 (1956);
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 529, 260 P.2d 570 (1953).
19. Illustrative cases are Lusk-Harbison-Jones, Inc. v. Universal Credit
Co., 164 Miss. 693, 145 So. 623 (1933) (promise to provide insurance); Fein-
berg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. 1959) (promise to pay a pension to
an employee); In re Jamison's Estate, 202 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1947) (promise to
reimburse loss on purchase price of stock); Schafer v. Fraser, 206 Ore. 446,
290 P.2d 190 (1955) (promise to contribute costs of a test suit).
20. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
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the doctrine has been securing a firm foothold in transactions
of a commercial character. 21
The requirement of consideration in the Anglo-American law
of contract has often been compared with the requirement of
cause in the civil law.22 In this regard it has been said that in
the modern civil law there is no principle more fundamental
than that an agreement without any additional element suffices
to constitute a contract, provided the agreement concerns a mat-
ter which is lawful.28 Therein, it is said, lies the crux of the
difference between the two systems. The common law is com-
mitted to the theory of bargain and exchange and, with the few
exceptions previously mentioned,24 will not enforce a promise
unless the person making it has asked for and received some-
thing in exchange. The civil law, however, purports to recognize
that a person may bind himself merely by expressing a will to do
so and for that reason it regards a promise as enforceable merely
because it is a promise.25 All that is required for a valid contract
are parties capable of contracting, their consent legally given,
and a lawful purpose.2 Although there is no requirement of
consideration in the common law sense, every obligation must
have a cause.2 "By the cause of the contract . . . is meant the
consideration or motive for making it."28 Cause is thus identified
21. See Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (assurance of
getting a franchise); Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Linebarger Const. Co., 219 Ark.
11, 240 S.W.2d 12 (1951) (bank loan made to subcontractor in reliance on
contractor's promise that so much would be due the subcontractor at a future
time); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958) (sub-
contractor's bid irrevocable); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d
123 (1958) (assurance of automobile dealership); Northwestern Eng'r Co. v.
Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1943) (subcontractor's promise to do
work if general contractor received contract); Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d
93 (Tex. 1965) (promise to furnish or obtain loan to finance construction of
shopping center); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis.2d 683, 133 N.W.2d
267 (1965) (promise of a super market franchise at a certain price).
22. See generally Mehren, Civil Law Analogues to Consideration: An
Exercise In Comparative Analysis, 72 HARV. L. RnV. 1009 (1959); Smith, A
Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REV. 1 (1951); Snellings, Cause and
Consideration, 8 TUL. L. REV. 178 (1934); Walton, Cause and Consideration in
Contracts, 41 L.Q. REV. 306 (1925).
23. Walton, Cause and Consideration in Contracts, 41 L.Q. REV. 306, 323
(1925). "The fundamental principle of modern civil law is that conventio
without more=Contractus. But it must be conventio about a lawful subject
matter." See also Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REV. 1, 3
(1951).
24. See text at notes 9-12 supra.
25. Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1951).
26. LA. Civ. CoDE art, 1779.
27. Id. at art. 1893.
28. Id. at art. 1896. Domat has been credited as being the creator of the
theory of cause and that theory is founded on three essential ideas: (1) In
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with motive and as such becomes the ultimate objective of the
contract. Since any cause not immoral or illegal is sufficient, it
would be impossible to enumerate the various causes of a con-
tract. The common law, however, generally recognizes a contract
as actionable only where there is consideration. Since considera-
tion is not present in every transaction, it could be said that the
common law recognizes only one specific cause, namely considera-
tion, in relation to the formation of contracts.
Article 1772 of the Louisiana Civil Code divides contracts
". in relation to the motive for making them" into gratuitous
and onerous contracts.29 A contract is gratuitous if its object is
to benefit the person with whom it is made even if it stems from
a gratitude for a benefit previously received, or from the hope
of receiving one in the future.80 An onerous contract involves
equivalents where something is promised or given in return even
though it be unequal in value.81 Thus, it can be seen that whether
a contract is onerous or gratuitous depends upon its cause. If it
arises out of a spirit of liberality it is gratuitous; if not, it is
onerous.
While the Code lists a number of specific gratuitous con-
tracts subject to special rules,82 the most important gratuitous
contract is the donation which is defined as "an act by which
the donor divests himself, at present and irrevocably of the thing
given in favor of the donee who accepts it."' 8 The donation in-
volves a depletion of the patrimony of the donor and is subject
synallagamatic contracts, the obligation of each of the two parties has as
a cause the engagement undertaken by the other. The two obligations
mutually sustain each other and serve, as Domat says, as the "foundation"
of the other. (2) In "real" contracts such obligation is created by the giving
of the thing. It is this "giving" which "forms" the obligation, which is the
"foundation" of it, or the cause. (3) In gratuitous contracts, where there is
neither reciprocity of obligations nor prior performance, the "cause" of the
obligation of the donor can only be found in the motive of liberal intention,
that is to say in the dominating reason which has pushed the author of the
donation to consent. See 2 PLANIOL, CvIL LAW TaEATISE nos. 1029, 1039 (La. St.
L. Inst. transl. 1959).
29. LA. Civ. CoD art. 1772. This article has no equivalent In the French
Code and it appears that the redactors were of the opinion that it Is in dis-
tinguishing onerous and gratuitous contracts that the element of cause be-
comes most relevant. See S. LITVINOFF, LOUiISNA CIvIL LAW TREATISE, OBIGA-
TioNS § 99 n. 39 (1969).
30. LA. CIV. COD art. 1773.
31. Id. at art. 1774.
32. The particular gratuitous contracts mentioned in the Code include:
(1) the mandate, art. 2991; (2) the loan for use, art. 2894; (3) the deposit,
art. 2929; and (4) the gratuitous suretyship, art. 3035.
33. LA. CIv. CoDE art. 1468.
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to the requirement of authentic form which is not applicable to
onerous contracts or to the special gratuitous contracts. 84 Since
the notarial act is a requirement peculiar to donations, it becomes
necessary to identify such contracts. The French have allocated
this task to the courts,85 but the redactors of the Louisiana Civil
Code have provided a more precise method by incorpoating ar-
ticles for which the French have no equivalent. These articles
divide donations into those that are purely gratuitous, those that
are onerous, and those that are remunerative. 86 Only those do-
nations that are purely gratuitous and are made from the sole
spirit of liberality are subject to authentic form and other rules
applicable to donations. Onerous7 and remunerative38 donations
are not considered as real donations and are treated as onerous
contracts unless the value of the thing given exceeds by one-half
the value of the charges imposed or the services rendered.3 9 Thus
it can be seen that as to the requirement of form, in Louisiana
a contract is either onerous or purely gratuitous. If it falls within
the latter category, a notarial act is required for its validity.
Charitable Subscriptions
The doctrine of promissory estoppel emerged out of cases
involving charitable subscriptions.4 0 Normally, a charitable sub-
scription is a promise to make a gift and as such does not purport
to be a contract. It has been said that "gift and contract are anti-
theticals; the former appears to arise out of generosity, the latter
out of bargain and quid pro quo."'41 Despite their gratuitous na-
34. Id. at art. 1536. The notarial act requirement serves several objec-
tives: it provides proof of the transaction as well as of the capacity of the
parties; it ensures that the donor has acted only after due deliberation and
thus provides protection to his family and heirs. Note, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
675 (1965).
35. 0ee S. IATVINOFF, LOUISIANA CivIL LAw TREATISE, OBLIGATIONS § 101 (1969).
36. LA. Cirv. Cops art. 1523.
"There are three kinds of donations inter vivos.
"The donation purely gratuitous, or that which is made without condition
and merely from liberality;
"The onerous donation, or that which is burdened with charges imposed
on the donee;
"The remunerative donation, or that the object of which Is to recompense
for services rendered."
37. Id. at art. 1524.
38. Id. at art. 1525.
39. Id. at art. 1526.
40. Allegheny College v. Nat'l C. Co. Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173
(1927). See also Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents, 50
MICH. L. REV. 639 (1952).
41. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents, 50 MICH. L.
REv. 639, 644 (1952).
[VOL. 31
COMMENTS
ture, court decisions have established the binding character of
such promises where made to educational, religious, and other
charitable groups.42 The common law, sensing a social need for
the enforcement of such promises, sought a justification for their
enforcement especially where the charity had taken action in re-
liance on them. Being bound by the bargain theory of contract
the courts had to squeeze these cases into the mold of considera-
tion and by employing various lines of reasoning were able to
"torture" gifts into contracts. Since nearly everyone is familiar
with the techniques employed by these courts it is only neces-
sary to recite them. 48 (1) The charitable subscription was viewed
as an offer to enter into either a bilateral or unilateral contract.
If the court was able to find a promise given by the charity, there
was a bargain; consideration was present, and enforcement was
assured. 44 Likewise, if the charity had performed some act which
could be construed as having been requested, performance of
that act would serve as an acceptance creating an obligation to
pay binding on the promisor.4" (2) Where there were a number
of subscribers it was said that all subscribers had a common
objective. They exchanged mutual promises and the promise of
each subscriber furnished consideration for all the others.46 (3)
Charitable subscriptions have also been enforced on the theory
that there was an implied promise to devote the proceeds of such
subscriptions to carrying out the purposes for which the charity
was founded.47
Eventually many common law courts became dissatisfied with
42. A. CORBiN, CONTRACTS § 198 (student ed. 1952).
43. See generally Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents,
50 Micn. L. REV. 639 (1952). See also Furman Univ. v. Waller, 124 S.C. 68, 117
S.E. 356 (1923) for an excellent case analysis.
44. Illustrative case: Tioga County Hosp. v. Tidd, 164 Misc. 273, 298 N.Y.S.
460 (1937).
45. Illustrative cases: Stone v. Prescott Special School Dist., 119 Ark. 553,
178 S.W. 399 (1915); First Trust Savings Bank v. Coe College, 8 Cal. App.2d
185, 47 P. 2d 481 (1935).
46. Christian College v. Hendley, 49 Cal. 347 (1874); Petty v. Trustees of
Church of Christ, 95 Ind. 278 (1883); Higert v. Trustees, 53 Ind. 326 (1876);
First Presbyterian Church v. Dennis, 178 Iowa 1352, 161 N.W. 183 (1917);
Cotner College v. Hyland, 133 Kan. 322, 299 P. 607 (1931); Comstock
v. Howd, 15 Mich. 236 (1867); Congregational Soc'y v. Perry, 6 N.H.
164 (1833); George v. Harris, 4 N.H. 533 (1829). See also S. W=LISTON, CON-
TRACTS §§ 117, 118 (1936).
47. Barnett v. Franklin College, 10 Ind. App. 103, 37 N.E. 427 (1894);
American Legion v. Thompson, 121 Ran. 124, 245 P. 744 (1926); Central
Maine Gen. Hosp. v. Carter, 125 Me. 191, 132 A. 417 (1926); Albert Lea College
v. Brown's Estate, 88 Minn. 524, 93 N.W. 672 (1903); Nebraska Wesleyan
Univ. v. Griswold's Estate, 113 Neb. 256, 202 N.W. 609 (1925); Baptist Female
Univ. v. Borden, 132 N.C. 476, 44 S.E. 47 (1903).
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the above rationalizations and shifted the emphasis away from
bargain and consideration toward induced reliance as a conse-
quence of the promise.4 8 This approach has been said to be more
realistic, because it recognizes that these subscriptions are actually
promises to make a gift and the finding of an "invented" or "il-
lusory" consideration does not in fact change their character.49
The modern trend is to enforce such subscriptions where the
charity has changed its position to its detriment in reliance on
the promise and the change was reasonably foreseeable to the
promisor, by estopping him from denying the existence of a
sufficient consideration to support the promise. Courts have found
reliance sufficient to bind the promisor where the charity has
made purchases in connection with the erection of a church,O
contracted to erect a building,51 or purchased land, erected a
building and operated a college.,52 This approach is inherently
fair. Where the charity has acted in reliance upon the promises
represented by these subscriptions and has incurred expenses,
buildings and other structures must be paid for and salaries must
be met. If the subscriber is not made to pay, the charity will
normally be left without the means of meeting these obligations.
Since the subscriber by making the promise has encouraged the
charity to incur expenses, it is only just that he be held liable on
his promise to pay.
In Louisiana, a similar problem of justification is faced.
However, since there is no requirement of consideration under
the Civil Code, the problem is reduced to determining whether
the subscription is a donation or an onerous contract. To arrive
at a proper conclusion the court will look to the motive of the
subscriber to determine whether he is acting from a pure spirit
of liberality or whether he is seeking some objective beneficial to
himself or to the community as a whole.53 The decision in Louisi-
ana College v. Keller54 is a good illustration of the manner in
48. See Furman Univ. v. Waller, 124 S.C. 68, 117 S.E. 356 (1923).
49. See Floyd v. Christian Church Widows & Orphans Home, 296 Ky. 196,
176 S.W.2d 125 (1943).
50. Calvary Presbyterian Church v. Brydon, 4 Cal. App.2d 676, 41 P.2d
377 (1935).
51. Trustees of Univ. of Pa. v. Coxe's Ex'rs, 277 Pa. 512, 121 A. 314 (1923).
52. Koch v. Lay, 38 Mo. 147 (1866); Furman Univ. v. Waller, 124 S.C. 68,
117 S.E. 356 (1923).
53. See S. LTVINOFF, LOUISIANA CivIL LAW TREATISE, OBLIGATIONS § 103 (1969);
Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. Ray. 1, 7 (1951); Snellings, Cause
and Consideration in Louis4ana, 8 TUL. L. Rov. 178, 205 (1934).
54. 10 La. 164 (1836).
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which the civil law has been employed to uphold the validity of
a charitable subscription. The case involved an action to recover
an amount under a written subscription. The subscriber had
agreed to pay the subscription provided the legislature would
establish a college in the town of Jackson. Although the legisla-
ture responded favorably, defendant refused to pay alleging a
lack of "consideration." The court, in sustaining the validity of
the subscription, stated that the consideration
"may have been the advantage the defendant expected to
derive from the establishment of a college at his own door,
by which he would save great expense in the education of
his children, or it may have been a spirit of liberality and a
desire to be distinguished as a patron of letters .... In con-
tracts of beneficence, the intention to confer a benefit is a
sufficient consideration. '55
The decision reaches the correct result while expressing con-
flicting views. It seems that the court was attempting to find
"consideration," but it spoke of consideration in terms of con-
ferring a benefit which as a motive would render the contract
gratuitous requiring a notarial act for its validity. Nevertheless,
the apparent finding that the subscriber sought to be distinguished
as a "patron of letters" or that he sought a reduction in the ex-
pense of educating his children illustrates that such motives are
sufficient to render the transaction an onerous contract valid
without necessity of authentic form.5
The same principle is illustrated in Baptist Hospital v. Cap-
pel57 where defendant had subscribed for for $500.00 to a hospital
for the purpose of aiding in the erection of a home for nurses.
Because of the possibility of a levee change, the site for the pro-
posed home was changed to a location some distance away from
the original site. Dissatisfied with the new location, defendant
refused to pay. The court upheld the binding character of the
subscription and reaffirmed the Keller rule reasoning that de-
fendant's motive in making the pledge was the prevention of the
loss of accreditation by the training institution so that the nurses
in training would not lose the time spent there. This having
been accomplished, the change in location in no way altered
55. Id. at 167.
56. See Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. Rlv. 1, 25-26 (1951).
57. 129 So. 425 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930).
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the achievement of the end sought, and the pledge was bind-
ing.58
The method employed by Louisiana courts is inescapably
similar to that employed by common law courts attempting to
enforce a charitable subscription upon the theory of bargain and
exchange. The common law seeks to find consideration in the
acts performed by the charity or in the pledges of other sub-
scribers. Louisiana courts attempt to find that the cause is not
a mere will to give but the attainment, as an end, of the estab-
lishment or maintenance of the institution to which the subscriber
has pledged his support. Although the ultimate result is the same,
the theory of cause is more realistic. Under the civil law a de-
termination that the transaction is a donation necessarily pre-
cludes the possibility of there being a bargain; but simply finding
no bargain does not result in a donation. 59 Thus, while the com-
mon law has resorted to the doctrine of promissory estoppel to
enforce those promises not supported by consideration, under the
civil law such promises not being donations are enforceable with-
out form.
Subcontractor Bids: Principles and Applications
The second area of comparison concerns the application of
58. Id. at 427. See also Dillard Univ. v. Longshoremen's Local 1419, 169
So.2d 221 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), where the statement was also made that
an intention to confer a benefit was sufficient to sustain a pledge to a hospital
expansion fund. (The action was dismissed, however, because the pledge had
been signed by a union leader without proper authority to do so.) But see
Oglethorpe Univ. v. Salmon, 1 La. App. 645-46 (1st Cir. 1925), where the de-
fendant had subscribed "for the purpose of founding a Southern Presbyterian
University in the city of Atlanta, Georgia, to be forever held in trust and
controlled by a self-perpetuating Board of Directors, each of whom shall be
a member, in good and regular standing of a Presbyterian Church, and each
of whom shall represent on said board-a gift of not less than $1000.00 to
said University." The court seemed to ignore the Keller case by dismissing
the suit on an exception of no cause of action for failure to allege in the
petition the performance of the specific purposes for which the promise was
given. Clearly, the court was looking for the common law consideration when
it said: "The failure to allege these purposes and that they have been com-
plied with is a failure to allege the consideration on which the promise
was made, which cannot be assumed from the allegations in the petition."
Td. at 646. It has been said of this case: "If this case may be relied upon,
the status of charitable subscriptions in Louisiana today would seem to be
identical with their positions in common law jurisdictions. Camse is left to
one side, and, the Ingenious concept of 'promissory estoppel' having yet to
find its way within our borders, the courts will continue to grope for some-
thing in the nature of consideration that these commendable promises may
be sustained. How much more satisfactory would be the giving effect to a
unilateral declaration of will grounded on a good cause." Snellings, Cause
and Consideration in Louisiana, 8 TUL. L. Rov. 178, 206 (1934).
59. Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REv. 1, 8 n.18 (1951).
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the doctrine of promissory estoppel to cases involving bids by
a subcontractor. These cases involve the principles of duration
and revocation of offer, and in order to properly analyze them,
a brief discussion of these principles is necessary.
At common law an offer is a proposal made by one party
to another creating in the offeree the power of establishing a con-
tract by making an appropriate acceptance.18 An offer, however, is
revocable at the will of the offeror any time prior to acceptance
unless supported by consideration.61 The offer remains revocable
even though the offeror may have expressly promised not
to revoke for a definite period of time. 2 Nevertheless, in such a
situation the acceptance must be made within the period specified
or the offer will automatically terminate and the power of the
offeree to accept will be lost. 8 Where no time for acceptance
has been specified, the offer remains open for a reasonable period
of time,0 4 which has been said to be as long as it takes to respond
to the offer through the same means of communication used to
convey the offer, or through such means as may have been
specified by the offeror.65 The offeree may, of course, reject the
offer,66 or it may be terminated because of the death or subse-
quent legal incapacity of either party.e Any revocation by the
offeror, however, must be communicated to the offeree to be ef-
fective68 The common law concept of consideration is as much
involved in the principle of offer as it is with validity of contracti
and the view that ".... an offeror should not lose his legal free-
60. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1932); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 11, 38
(1950); S. WILLSTON, CONTRACTS § 25 (stud. ed. 1938).
61. S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 55 (stud. ed. 1938); 17 Am. JUR. 2d Contracts
§ 36 (1964). The right before acceptance to revoke an ordinary offer, or an
offer not supported by consideration is unquestioned.
62. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 38 (1950); S. WILLSTON, CONTRACTS § 61 (stud.
ed. 1938).
63. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 40(1) (1932); 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 35
(1950); S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 53 (stud. ed. 1938).
64. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 40 (1932); 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 35,
36 (1950); S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 54 (stud. ed. 1938).
65. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 40(3), 51 (1932); 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 36 (1950). See also Litvinoff, Offer and Acceptance in Louisiana Law: A
Comparative Analysis, 28 LA. L. REv. 1 (1967).
66. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 35, 37 (1932); 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §
94 (1950); S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 50, 51 (stud. ed. 1938).
67. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 35, 48 (1932); 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §
54 (1950); S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 50a, 62 (stud. ed. 1938).
68. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 41, 42 (1932); 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §
39 (1950); S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 56 (stud. ed. 1938).
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dom to revoke his offer before acceptance, unless has has asked
for and received something in return. . ."9 reflects this fact.
French law recognizes the binding effect of a manifested will
even though nothing is sought in return. Since Louisiana derives
its law from this source, it should follow that a person may
make an offer, irrevocable for a period of time, merely by ex-
pressing a will to do s00 The Louisiana Civil Code provides that
a contract is not complete until there has been an acceptance of
the offer by the offeree.7 1 However, the offeror is not allowed
to withdraw his offer "... without allowing such reasonable time
as from the terms of the offer he has given, or from the circum-
stances of the case he may be supposed to have intended to give
the party, to communicate his determination.' 2 Quite clearly,
then, the code provides that the offeror cannot revoke (1) when-
ever he has expressly given the other party a certain period of
time within which to communicate his acceptance, or (2) when
no period has been specified, before such time as it may be
presumed from the circumstances of the case that he intended
to allow.78 It has been suggested that the "circumstances of the
case" include not only the "situation of the parties and the na-
ture of the contract,'7 4 but other factors such as "the experience
of previous dealings between the parties, the conventional usages
of a particular trade, and the nature of the thing which forms the
object of the contract.'7 5 During the reasonable period of time, as
determined by these circumstances, the offeror may not revoke
and an acceptance communicated within such period will be
considered as timely and effective.70 An acceptance made after
this period has elapsed will be considered as untimely and may
69. Smith, A Rtefresher course in Cause, 12 IA. L. Rsv. 1, 32 (1951).
70. Id.
71. LA. Civ. CoDr art. 1800 provides: "The contract, consisting of a propo-
sition and the consent to it, the agreement is incomplete until the acceptance
of the person to whom it is proposed."
72. Id. art. 1809.
73. Litvinoff, Offer and Acceptance in Louisiana Law: A Comparative
Analysis, 28 LA. L. Rsv. 1, 39 (1967).
74. Pascal, Duration and Revoocability of an Offer, 1 LA. L. REV. 182, 189
(1939).
75. Litvinoff, Offer and Acceptance in Louisian Law: A Comparative
Analysis, 28 LA. L. Rzv. 1, 40 (1967).
76. LA. Crv. CODE art. 1802 provides: "He is bound by his proposition, and
the signification of his dissent will be of no avail, if the proposition be made
in terms, which evince a design to give the other party the right to concluding
the contract by his assent; and if that assent be given within such time as
the situation of the parties and the nature of the contract shall prove that
it was the intention of the proposer to allow."
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be rejected.7 These are the principles as expressed in our Code.1
Although it has been said that the courts have tended to lose
sight of them79 and have been reluctant to apply them,80 it has
been aptly demonstrated that they are not entirely unsupported
by the jurisprudence.8' Any reluctance that may exist has been
attributed to the influence of the common law and its doctrine
of consideration.82
Promissory estoppel, as pointed out, has been freely applied
in the area of gratuitous promises,s8 but only recently8 4 and not
vigorously 6 been applied to commercial transactions. There is
nothing in section 90 to indicate that it should not be so ex-
tended.86 That recital contains only those elements that must be
established in order to recover, and there is no qualifications as
to the factual situation to which the doctrine may be applied.87
Among those commercial transactions to which the doctrine has
been applied are bids by a subcontractor.88 The most interesting
case in this area is Drennan v. Star Paving Co.89 Plaintiff-general
contractor had called for bids in connection with a school con-
struction job. Defendant-subcontractor submitted his paving bid
by telephone the afternoon before plaintiff was to submit his bid
on the general contract, as was the custom in the trade and
community. Plaintiff did not immediately accept defendant's bid,
but since it was the lowest, he used it in computing his own
bid. As plaintiff was required to do, he included defendant's name
as one of the subcontractors who were to perform and posted a
77. LA. CIV. CODE art 1801.
78. See Litvinoff, Offer and Acceptance in Louisiana Law: A Compara-
tive Analysis, 28 LA. L. REv. 1 (1967); Pascal, Duration and Revocability of an
Offer, 1 IA. L. REv. 182 (1939); Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L.
REv. 1 (1951).
79. Note, 7 LA. L. Rev. 147, 148-49 (1946), and cases cited therein.
80. See Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REv. 1, 32 (1951),
and cases cited therein.
81. See Litvinoff, Offer and Acceptance in Louisiana Law: A Compara-
tive Analysis, 28 LA. L. REV. 1, 44-61 (1967).
82. Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REv. 1, 32 (1951); Note,
23 TUL. L. REv. 286, 288 (1948).
83. See note 19 supra.
84. See note 21 supra.
85. See Note, 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 413 (1959).
86. Id.
87. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
88. Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll Rand Co. 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941)
("The mere fact that the transaction is commercial in nature should not
preclude the use of promissory estoppel." (dictum) Id. at 661); Drennan v.
Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); Northwestern Eng'r Co.
v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1943). Cf. James Baird v. Gimbel
Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
89. 51 Cal.2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
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bidder's bond of ten per cent of his total bid. Plaintiff was
awarded the general contract on the very same day. When plain-
tiff visited defendant's office the next day, he intended to formally
accept the offer, but was immediately informed that there had
been a mistake in the estimate and that the subcontractor would
not perform at the quoted price. Plaintiff demanded performance
but defendant refused. Thereafter plaintiff secured another to do
the paving at a higher price and sought to recover the excess as
damages. The defense was that there was no enforceable contract
since defendant's offer was revocable, and that he had revoked
before the communication of plaintiff's acceptance. Plaintiff con-
tended that his reliance upon defendant's offer was justifiable
and that he had suffered a substantial loss in reliance thereon for
which defendant was responsible. The court found that it was
reasonably foreseeable that defendant's bid, if it were the lowest,
would be used by the contractor in computing his bid. Since it
had been so incorporated and the contractor had bound himself
to perform at the stated price, he had undergone a prejudicial
change in position. Under such circumstances the court held that
there was an implied subsidiary promise not to revoke until the
contractor had a reasonable opportunity, after being awarded the
general contract, to accept. Defendant was then estopped to assert
a lack of consideration for the promise.90
The decision, of course, is at war with the principle that an
offeror is in complete control of his offer and may revoke at
any time prior to acceptance by the offeree. It is clear that at
common law the mere use of a subcontractor's bid does not con-
stitute an acceptance of it.91 The court, however, saw a similarity
between a justifiable reliance on an offer and the situation in
which there is an attempt to revoke an offer for a unilateral con-
tract after the offeree has begun his performance.92 The real
90. "Reasonable reliance resulting in foreeable prejudicial change In
position offers a compelling basis also for implying a subsidiary promise not
to revoke an offer for a bilateral contract." Id. at 414, 333 P.2d at 760.
91. Note, 32 S. CAL. L. Rv. 413, 416 n. 16 (1959).
92. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1932): "If an offer for a unilateral
contract is made, and part of the consideration requested in the offer is given
or tendered by the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a con-
tract, the duty of immediate performance of which is conditional on the full
consideration being given or tendered within the time stated in the offer, or,
if no time is stated therein, within a reasonable time.
"In such a case, it is now generally held that the offered promise becomes
irrevocable (and in a sense 'binding') as soon as the offeree has partly per-
formed. The promise has been made binding by the promisee's action in re-
liance; but that action is a part of the bargained-for equivalent. In some
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similarity is that in both situations the law is concerned with
the prevention of injustice to the offeree due to the fact that
there is no enforceable contract. But, the reason for the absence
of a contract in the two situations is different. In the former
there has been no acceptance at all while in the latter the of-
feree has been prevented from completing an acceptance al-
ready commenced. The difference is quite important. In the first
situation the offeree has not done what was requested. 3 In the
second, the very thing requested was being done prior to the
offeror's intervention.9 4 In the unilateral contract situation, con-
sideration for the implied subsidiary promise not to revoke is
found in the commencement of performance; 5 in the case of
promissory estoppel, there being no consideration, whether there
is sufficient justifiable reliance upon which to base an estoppel
depends upon a finding that such reliance was reasonably fore-
seeable to the offeror.9 6
The application of promissory estoppel to the relationship of
prime contractor and subcontractor may be questioned on the
cases, the offer has been held to be irrevocable after action in reliance upon
It by the offeree that did not constitute a part of the requested consideration."
See also 1 A. CoaRBN, CONTRACTS § 206 at 260 (1963).
93. For example in Drennan the court found that "[T]here is no evidence
that defendant offered to make its bid irrevocable in exchange for plaintiffs
use of its figures in computing his bid. Nor is there evidence that would
warrant interpreting plaintiff's use of defendant's bid as the acceptance
thereof, binding plaintiff, on condition he received the main contract to award
the sub-contract to defendant. In sum, there was neither an option supported
by consideration nor a bilateral contract binding on both parties." 51 Cal.2d
409, 413, 333 P.2d. 757, 759 (1958).
94. See Note, 32 S. CAL. L. REv. 413, 417 n.18 (1959): "If the action by
the offeree is not part performance of the requested consideration and also
is not such action as the offeror had reason to foresee as the result of his
offer, it will not make the offer irrevocable in any sense. One who submits
a bid for supplying materials requests and has reason to foresee and ac-
ceptance, by part performance it may be; but usually he should not be
held to foresee that the offeree would make a contract with a third person
at a price that is determined by the terms of the bid, before the bid itself
has been accepted and without notifying the bidder that his bid is going to
be so used. Even if he knows that his bid will be used as a basis for bidding
on some larger contract, it should still be revocable by notice given while
the offeree's bid on the larger contract is still revocable at will." See 1
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 51 at 162 (1950).
95. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1932).
96. "[Wlhether that promise is of such a nature that the promisor
should reasonably expect it to induce some action or forbearance by the
promisee is to be regarded from the viewpoint of the promisor. Hence, one
seeking to apply the doctrine must test the promise in the light of all the
circumstances as they were known to the promisor. Once those circumstances
are understood, the next step is to determine whether a reasonable man, ac-
quainted with these circumstances, should have expected this promise to in-
duce action by the promisee." Boyer, Promissory Etoppel: Requirements
and lAmitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. RPv. 459, 461 (1950).
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basis that it serves only to benefit the prime contractor who may
be able, after utilizing the subcontractor's bid, to engage in "bid-
peddling" and "bid-shopping" on the basis of that bid, while being
secure in the realization that he may still hold the subcontractor
to his bidY1 The subcontractor has no assurance, even if his bid
has been utilized, that he will be awarded the subcontract.98
On the other hand, it may be said, at least in a case like Drennan
where prompt acceptance was attempted, that because the sub-
contractor is the one most qualified to determine the accuracy of
his bid the mistake belongs to him and not to the prime con-
tractor.9 9 Nevertheless, despite the general rule at common law
that no duty is imposed upon one who makes an informal promise
unsupported by consideration, 100 the doctrine of promissory estop-
pel may be used to impose a duty where there has been fore-
seeable justifiable reliance, even to the extent of making a revoc-
able offer irrevocable.
The Louisiana jurisprudence concerning bids by a subcon-
tractor is equally intriguing. In Harris v. Lillis,101 defendant-
subcontractor submitted his bid to perform certain roofing work
on a proposed residence. Plaintiff-general contractor utilized de-
fendant's bid in submitting his own, which was accepted by the
owner shortly thereafter. After plaintiff had mailed a formal ac-
ceptance of defendant's bid, defendant attempted to revoke his
offer. The lower court found that a contract had been formed by
plaintiff's timely acceptance and consequently, defendant could
not revoke his offer. The appellate court concurred in this find-
ing, but without citation of any Code authority went on to add:
"Moreover it seems manifest that, in accordance with
the custom prevailing in the building trade in New Orleans,
an offer by a subcontractor to a general contractor to do
97. See Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in
the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHi. L. REv. 237 (1952).
98. It has been suggested, however, that the contractor's problem could
be solved by:
(1) entering into an agreement with the subcontractor, conditional upon
the contractor's bid being accepted; or
(2) an option or a bid bond or other such device. However, it has been
pointed out that such formal agreement is often impractical, because
subcontractors frequently wait until the very last day to submit
their bids in order to take advantage of using the latest market
prices. Note, 26 Mo. L. Rlv. 356, 349 (1961).
99. Note, 32 S. CAL. L. REv. 413, 418-19 (1959).
100. RESTATEM NT OF CONTRACTS § 75, comment (a) (1932).
101. 24 So.2d 689 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
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work is irrevocable after the contractor has used the estimate
of the subcontractor as a basis for his offer to the owner and
the owner has accepted the general contractor's bid."102 (Em-
phasis added.)
In R. P. Farnsworth v. Albert,03 defendant-subcontractor sub-
mitted his bid for certain plastering work to plaintiff who, in
reliance thereon, incorporated it into his bid which was subse-
quently submitted to and accepted by the owner. Defendant,
upon discovering an error in his bid, communicated to plaintiff
his intent to withdraw the offer. At that time there had been no
attempt by plaintiff to communicate an acceptance to defendant.
When plaintiff demanded performance and defendant refused,
plaintiff secured the services of another at a higher price and
brought an action against defendant for the difference. The de-
fense was that the revocation prior to acceptance by the general
contractor was timely and effective. The federal district court
relying upon the ruling in Harris v. Lillis,04 held the offer to be
irrevocable after its use by the general contractor and its ac-
ceptance by the owner, and thus gave the general contractor a
reasonable time thereafter to accept the bid. The circuit court, 0 5
however, was not convinced. It found that the alleged custom had
been neither properly pleaded nor proved in the lower court.
In addition it found that the lower court's reliance on Harris
had been misplaced for the reason that the portion of the opinion
dealing with the custom of the building trade in New Orleans was
unnecessary to the decision in that case and constituted mere
dictum. 108 In remanding the case, however, the court clearly rec-
ognized that proof of the existence of such a custom would be
relevant in determining, under the provisions of the Code, what
could be presumed to have been the intention of the offeror.10 7
102. Id. at 691.
103. 79 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. La. 1948).
104. 24 So.2d 689 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
105. Albert v. R. P. Farnsworth, 176 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1949).
106. Id. at 201.
107. Id. at 203. "This is not to say, though, that on another trial, proof
of a custom or practice would not be relevant in determining ...whether
the proposition was made 'in terms, which evince a design to give the other
party the right of concluding the contract by his assent,' and whether the
assent was 'given within such time as the situation of the parties and the
nature of the contract shall prove that it was the intenion of the proposer
to allow,' or . . . that the offer was made 'allowing such reasonable time as
from the terms of his he has given, or from the circumstances of the case
he may be supposed to have intended to give to the party, to communicate
his determination.'"
19701
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The finding of the court as to the effect of the Harris case
seems to have been correct. In that case, an acceptance had
been timely communicated to the subcontractor before any at-
tempt to withdraw had been made. Thus, the decision stands
only for the proposition that a contract is completed by a timely
acceptance of an offer, properly communicated, and not for the
proposition that utilization of a subcontractor's bid by the con-
tractor and acceptance by the owner thereafter serves to make
the bid irrevocable. If the offer did not become irrevocable until
its use by the contractor and acceptance by the owner, then it
would necessarily follow that prior to that time it would be
revocable at the will of the subcontractor. Such a proposition
would be plainly contrary to the provisions of article 1809 of
the Civil Code. 08
The circumstances surrounding the relationship of contractor-
subcontractor are quite susceptible to and should not depart from
the general rule that an offer should remain open for a period
of time "as the situation of the parties and the nature of the
contract shall prove that it was the intention of the proposer
to allow." Among those circumstances to be considered are the
custom and conventional usage of a particular trade and the
previous dealings of the parties.1 9 When a subcontractor submits
a bid to a general contractor it is understood that it is submitted
on a competitive basis as one among many. It is certainly within
the contemplation of the parties that if the subcontractor's bid is
the "low bid," it will be utilized by the prime contractor in the
submission of his own bid for the entire job. The subcontractor
expects that if his bid is so used, he will be awarded the sub-
contract for which he extended the offer. It is also understood
that whether or not the subcontractor gets the job necessarily
depends upon whether the general contractor's bid is accepted
by the owner. The subcontractor and the contractor each have
an expectation in the possible profits to be derived from the
entire transaction. These factors would seem to indicate that
a reasonable period of time for acceptance is implied in the
108. Albert v. R. P. Farnsworth, 176 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1949). But see
Schwenk, Culpa In Contrahendo in German, French and Louisiana Law, 15
TUL. L. REV. 87 (1940), where an interpretation is given to Articles 1801, 1802,
and 1809 which allows revocation of offers and protects the reliance of the
offeree by the use of culpa in contrahendo.
109. See text at note 75 supra.
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subcontractor's offer irrespective of the existence of any particu-
lar custom."10
The dicta in Harris v. Lillis"' appears to call for a result
similar to that reached by the California court in Drennan v.
Star Paving Co.1 12 and its application of promissory estoppel.
The Louisiana Civil Code provides a remedy to the problem pre-
sented by the factual situation of that case without resort to
promissory estoppel or evidence of custom. The Code requires
an acceptance of an offer to complete the contract but the offeror
may not revoke his offer without allowing such reasonable time
as from the terms of his offer or from the circumstances of the
case he may be supposed to have intended to give the party to
communicate his acceptance.113
It has been suggested that article 1809 should be interpreted
in such a manner so as to allow revocation of an offer while
awarding recovery of the reliance interest on the basis of culpa
in contrahendo.14 That doctrine, however, has apparently been
utilized in German law to compensate for the absence of a gen-
eral principle of delictual liability such as that contained in the
Louisiana Civil Code." 5 The Louisiana Civil Code provides that
the obligation is complete when acceptance has been timely com-
municated despite an unlawful attempt at revocation."" This
principle has been given recognition by the courts which have
awarded the full contractual interest where such attempt has
been made.1 7 The doctrine is thus inapplicable to cases involv-
110. Litvinoff, Offer and Acceptance in Louisiana Law: A Comparative
Analysis, 28 LA. LAw Rsv. 1, 58 (1969).
111. 24 So.2d 689 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
112. 51 Cal.2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
113. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1802. "He is bound by his proposition, and. the
signification of his dissent will be of no avail . . . if that assent be given
within such time as the situation of the parties and the nature of the con-
tract shall prove that it was the intention of the proposer to allow."
114. In German law the theory may be stated as follows "If a contract
is or becomes void by the fault or misunderstanding of one party, the law
imposes on the party who is at fault or whose act created the risk of mis-
understanding, the liability to compensate the innocent party for any actual
change of position in reliance on the apparently perfect contract." Schwenk,
Culpa In Contrahendo in German, French and Louisiana Law, 15 TUL. L. REv.
87, 90 (1940).
115. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2315. "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
116. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1802, 1809.
117. Ryder v. Frost, 3 La. Ann. 523 (1848); Ever-Tite Roofing Corp. v.
Green, 83 So.2d 449 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955); Times Picayune Pub. Co. v.
Harang, 10 La. App. 242, 120 So. 416 (Orl. Cir. 1929); Picou v. St. Bernard
Parish School Ed., 132 So. 130 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1924). Litvinoff, Offer and
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ing revocation of offer. If revocation were allowed, no contrac-
tual liability would result. If no contract results due to the fault
of the offeror, liability should properly be predicated on quasi-
delictual grounds." 8
Miscellaneous: Louisiana Law
Louisiana courts have enforced promises or representations
upon which another has acted in a number of cases, thereby
avoiding injustice. Relief in such cases has been afforded, not-
by resort to the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel,
but by solutions consistent with the general principles of the
Civil Code. A few cases will serve to illustrate.
In Choppin v. Dauphin" the owner of a tomb was held to
be estopped to insist upon the removal therefrom of the remains
of plaintiff's deceased relatives. The remains had been placed
there in reliance upon the promise of defendant's ancestor that
they should remain there forever. The court held that the prom-
ise was binding upon the ancestor during his lifetime, and after
his death upon his heirs. In so holding the court stated:
"There was by his words and still more by his conduct, the
manifestation of his purpose that the remains of the Chop-
pins should have a final resting place in this tomb, and on
the faith of that promise so distinctively avowed, these plain-
tiffs permitted the transfer of the remains of their dead....
The principle of estoppel so often applied in controversies
involving pecuniary rights, will not permit the withdrawal
of promises or engagements on which another has acted." 20
In Southern Discount Co. v. Williams,121 plaintiff, after an
abortive attempt at settlement, agreed to give the defendant
additional time to file an answer. Plaintiff, however, took a
default judgment within twelve calendar days after making the
promise. In setting aside the judgment, the appellate court
declared that even though defendant's promise may have been
Acceptance in Louisiana Law: A Comparative Analysis, 28 LA. L. REv. 1, 67
(1967).
118. Litvinoff, Offer and Acceptance in Louisiana Law: A Comparative
Analysis, 28 LA. L. Rnv. 1, 67 (1967).
119. 48 La. Ann. 1217, 20 So. 681 (1896).
120. Id. at 1220, 20 So. at 682.
121. 226 So.2d 60 (La, App. 4th Cir. 1969).
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without "consideration," he was estopped to repudiate the prom-
ise upon which plaintiff had relied to her detriment.
In both these cases the elements of promissory estoppel are
present. The language employed by the court is similar to that
used by common law courts when enforcing a promise under
that doctrine. Nevertheless, the true basis is clearly that of a
completed contract. There was a promise or proposal based upon
a lawful purpose, accepted by those to whom it was made.
In Marsalis v. LaSalle,122 plaintiff was bitten by a cat while
in defendant's store. Defendant was not negligent as the cat
had not previously exhibited dangerous tendencies. Recent
reports of rabid animals aroused fear that the cat might be
infected. Defendant promised to confine the animal for the nec-
essary period of observation. The cat, however, was allowed its
usual freedom whereupon it disappeared before the required
period had elapsed. When plaintiff was required to undergo
precautionary treatment from which she suffered an injurious
reaction, she brought an action for damages. The court allowed
recovery on the theory that while no initial duty was imposed
upon defendant, she had given an express promise upon which
plaintiff had relied. Defendant was thus liable for the bodily
harm resulting from her failure to use reasonable care in dis-
charging the obligation assumed.
In most common law jurisdictions there is no liability in
tort for an injury caused by reliance on a gratuitous promise.12
The rule is apparently based upon two factors: (1) the require-
ment of consideration to render a promise enforceable, and
(2) the general rule that no liability is imposed for failure to
act when there is no duty to act. The rule, however, admits of
an exception. Where one voluntarily undertakes to perform,
even gratuitously, he assumes the obligation of exercising rea-
sonable care in his performance. The basis for the exception lies
in the fact that by commencement of performance he may have
induced the plaintiff to refrain from taking action in his own
behalf.124 The vitality of the rule remains, but has been seri-
ously challenged by the expanded use of promissory estoppel.125
122. 94 So. 2d 120 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957).
123. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 186 (2d ed. 1955).
124. Id. at 187.
125. Note, 18 LA. L. Rev. 584 (1958).
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It is submitted that the basis of the obligation in Louisiana
is the promise and not the undertaking. Failure to properly dis-
charge the assumed obligation, whether it results from intention
or negligence, constitutes fault imposing liability to indemnify
for the harm caused. In Marsalis the court clearly stated that
the express promise gave rise to the obligation. While quoting
freely from the Restatement of Torts and actually basing its deci-
sion on a provision therein,126 the court was, in fact, providing a
solution consistent with the principles of the Civil Code.
The principle expressed in Marsalis finds support in the later
case of Hano v. Kinchen.12 In that case a buyer of hogs prom-
ised to provide compensation insurance to cover employees of
the seller and actually withheld money from the purchase price
to pay the premiums. In reliance, the seller failed to procure
his own insurance and was held liable for his employee's injur-
ies. In an action by the seller against the buyer, the buyer was
held liable on the theory that his failure to perform the obliga-
tion so assumed required him to reimburse the loss suffered by
the plaintiff.1'
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Ducote v. Oden 29 clearly
rejected the doctrine of promissory estoppel. It denied relief
because the evidence was insufficient to show that the alleged
representation was made, or if made, that the action of plaintiff
had followed in reliance thereon. Assume, however, that repre-
sentations had been made under such circumstances that it was
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that plaintiff would
take action in reliance upon them. In the absence of a specific
agreement as to the term of the employment the question arises
126. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 325 (1934): "One who gratuitously under-
takes with another to do an act or to render services which he should
recognize as necessary to the other's bodily safety and thereby leads the
other in reasonable reliance upon the performance of such undertaking (a)
to refrain from himself taking the necessary steps to secure his safety or
from securing the then available protective action by third persons, or (b)
to enter upon a course of conduct which is dangerous unless the under-
taking is carried out, is subject to liability to the other for bodily harm re-
sulting from the actor's failure to exercise reasonable care to carry out his
undertaking.
"Comment (a) The actor may undertake to do an act or to render ser-
vices either by an express promise to do so or by a course of conduct which
the actor should realize would lead the other into the reasonable belief that
the act would be done or the services rendered."
127. 122 So.2d 889 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
128. See also Carpenter v. Madden, 90 So.2d 508 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
129. 221 La. 228, 59 So.2d 130 (1952).
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as to whether the plaintiff would have any recourse under Lou-
isiana law. It is submitted that a basis for recovery is embodied
in the general principle of delictual and quasi-delictual respon-
sibility expressed in article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
That article covers not only actions but omissions as well. It
would appear that the Code indirectly imposes a duty upon the
parties involved in negotiating a contract to act honestly and
judiciously. The Code declares that where doubt or obscurity
arises due to the lack of necessary explanation which one of the
parties should have given, or from any negligence or fault of
his, the agreement shall be construed against him.180 While it is
true that the Code does not define fault and only provides for
the responsibility of certain classes of persons with regard to
their actions, it is not the sole source for prescribing what
actions or omissions constitute fault. Where the positive law is
silent, the judge is bound to proceed and decide equitably appeal-
ing to natural law and reason or to receive usages.'3'
Conclusion
The common law of contracts is based upon consideration
and the mutality of bargain. The doctrine of promissory estoppel
is based upon an unbargained-for reliance upon a promise where
the reliance is both foreseeable to the promisor and detrimental
to the promisee. It is used as a substitute for consideration and
is thus predicated on the absence of an otherwise valid contract.
Louisiana contract law is governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code which do not require consideration but utilize the
analagous concept of cause. As indicated by the court in Ducote,
there is no basis in the Code for the doctrine of promissory estop-
pel, and there is no need for Louisiana courts to adopt this device.
The provisions of the Code provide a remedy in most analagous
situations to which the doctrine has been applied. The following
basic distinctions lend support to this conclusion.
(1) Under the concept of cause, it is generally believed that
a mere manifestation of the intention to be bound will result in
a binding obligation. At common law there must be something
bargained for and given in exchange, or some equivalent.
Because the concept of cause is thus broader than consideration,
130. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1958.
131. LA. Civ. CODE art. 21.
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more promises may be enforced without resort to promissory
estoppel.
(2) At common law an offer unsupported by consideration
is revocable at any time prior to acceptance. Under the Louisi-
ana Civil Code an offer is irrevocable for a period of time as
expressed by the person making it, or for a reasonable period
to be implied from the nature of the contract and the circum-
stances of the case. At common law promissory estoppel has
been used to render an otherwise revocable offer irrevocable in
the face of justifiable reliance. In Louisiana there is no need to
resort to this doctrine, as an acceptance timely communicated
will create a binding obligation despite an unlawful attempt at
revocation.
(3) The Louisiana Civil Code provides no catalogue of torts
but contains a general principle of delictual and quasi-delictual
responsibility which is susceptible of expansion and which may
even be applied to negligent actions or omissions of parties nego-
tiating a contract. Such an application would result in liability
for harm caused by actions or omissions where the risk of harm
was reasonably foreseeable to the one acting or refraining.
Frederick H. Sutherland
CONTINENTAL SHELF LAW: OUTDISTANCED BY SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY
In contrast to the traditionally slow development of legal
systems which evolve over many years, an entire legal regime
dealing with the continental shelf has developed since 1945. This
unique birth of the legal framework for exploiting the natural
resources of the continental shelf was precipitated by technologi-
cal advances which made the newly discovered wealth of these
areas accessible to exploitation. Far from being complete, this
legal regime remains one of the most dynamic areas of interna-
tional law. Science and technology are moving ahead far more
rapidly than is the law governing this area of the marine environ-
ment. Thus, a very new body of law has already become in large
part inadequate to deal with problems of far reaching economic
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